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Summary
:
The research reported here has been the estimation of cost functions for several types of
California correctional institutions over the period 1948 to 1964 and for selected Califor-
nia jails in 1971-72. Prisons and jails are considered as multiple-product firms producing
confinement, hotel-like amenities, and rehabilitation, Lacking a convincing measure of
rehabilitative output, we netted out items clearly associated with that aspect of output
and took average daily inmate population as the product measure. For the maximum security
prisons there were significant economies of scale, tempered somewhat by the component of
costs associated with a more violent inmate population. For medium security prisons we
found long-run constant returns to scale in confinement. And lastly, for city and county
jails it appears to be the case that there are constant returns to scale.
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According to a recent joint report of the Bureau of the Census
and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, expenditures by all
governmental units on correctional institutions and programs amounted
to almost $2.5 billion in fiscal 1972. » Yet despite the magnitude of
the resources devoted to corrections, this activity has been subject to
very little formal cost analysis. This is not to say that individuals
working in corrections or, for that matter, in the public sector in
general have not been concerned with the costs of these activities. Nor
has there been a paucity of descriptive studies on the costs of correc-
tions. What has been lacking are detailed analytic cost studies of
corrections, especially correctional institutions. It is to this latter
and relatively unexplored area that this research is directed.
Granted that there has been a lack of analytic cost analysis of
correctional institutions, of what use to decision-makers is such anal-
ysis? After all, most, if not all, correctional decision-makers have
seen data on the cost per inmate in their systems and as far back as
1967 the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice provided national data on costs per offender or inmate. While
Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System , 1974.
The major expenditures were at the state and local level, $2.3 billion,
and represented 23% of their expenditures on criminal justice and
somewhat over 1.5% of their total expenditures for goods and services.
A review of the recent ABA Correctional Economic Center, Economics of
Crime and Corrections Bibliography , revealed only one analytical study
of prison costs (unpublished as of this date).
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undoubtedly some correctional authorities have found this type of cost
information useful in decision-making and most have found it interesting,
it is unlikely that such descriptive cost data has been of significant
value in decision-making for the vast majority of correctional authorities* rs
It is our contention that descriptive cost information, even if it is as
specific as the cost per inmate-day at institution X, can be made rele- .
vant for the majority of correctional decision-makers only after they
have been provided with a reasonable amount of information on the basic
cost structure of the activities under their supervision. The emphasis
here is on structure. There is no question that decision-makers in the
public sector traditionally lack sufficiently detailed and accurate cost
information for many decisions. However, our point is that even if more
accurate and detailed data were available, its utility in decision-making
would more often than not be constrained by a lack of knowledge concerning :•
the underlying cost structure of many correctional activities.
A crucial question for most decision-makers in corrections is: How
will the total cost of a correctional activity, e.g., incarceration,
increase (decrease) with an increase (decrease) in the activity level?
More detailed and accurate descriptive information on costs alone is uo?*
likely to provide an answer to this question. While it is true, as we >
shall establish in a subsequent section of this report, that "better"
data can provide more accurate decision-relevant cost figures, realizing
this potential requires that the basic cost relationships of the various
correctional activities have been specified. Certainly, the more compre-
hensive and accurate the initial data base, the more precise will be the '
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Initial cost structure specification. Nonetheless, the key element in
decision-relevant cost data is a reasonable degree of knowledge concern-
ing basic cost structure or more precisely the relationship between total
costs and total activity levels. It is in this area, the relationship
between total costs and total activity levels, that the application of
economic cost concepts can have a significant impact on our understanding
of correctional cost data.
We have taken a case study approach. Chosen for this purpose were
five California State Correctional Institutions and 128 city and county
jails within the State of California. All of the basic cost data for
this study was obtained from published sources. The cost data on State
Correctional Institutions was taken from the budgets of the California
Department of Corrections reported in the California State Budget , 1948-1964,
and the cost data for city and county jails from the California Bureau
of Criminal Statistics, Jail Space Utilization Study .
Viewed from the governmental level, correctional activities or
outputs are intermediate products or inputs in a government's production
of crime control. Correction authorities, or specifically in the case
of the state of California, the Department of Corrections, are a supplier
of intermediate products, but unlike most such suppliers in the private
sector, they supply their output to only a single buyer, the state govern-
ment, in this example. Thus perhaps the private sector analogue most
applicable to corrections is that of a vertically integrated firm or of
a monopsonistic buyer from a monopolistic seller. This being the case,
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models of bilateral monopoly or pf inter-firm decision-caking would
seem to be the relevant ones from which to begin. It may well be that
by ignoring the structure of the market in which the California Depart-
ment of Corrections operates we shall have biased our cost estimates.
However, we have chosen to examine correctional institutions as if
they were cost-minimizing businesses and have thus eschewed all questions
of market structure.
In section. II we explore the problems of defining the output of
correctional institutions. Section III reports a short-run total
cost function and an average cost function for two maximum security
prisons in California. The following section suggests the form for
long-run total cost functions in three medium security prisons. Sec-
tion V reports regression results for a sample of county jails In Cali-
fornia where the output definition problems ae not as severe as they
are for prisons. In section VI we suai&arize our results.
II.
Cost functions relate output levels to costs, and thus before we
can actually estimate such functions for correctional institutions we
must deal with the t'obleti of specifying the output of such institutions.
Here the name is the message, and correctional institutions are supposed
to correct or rehabilitate a subset of the population convicted of criminal
behavior. Although there is currently a great deal of debate concerning
•
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•
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It is a subset since not all convicted criminals are actually
sent to such institution's.
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cerning the degree of rehabilitation that takes place in correctional
institutions, the facts concerning the precise level of rehabilitative
output are as yet unknown, and at the present state of knowledge we
can safely assume that one output of most correctional institutions
is rehabilitation. In addition to rehabilitation, correctional
institutions produce the obvious output of confinement. This confine-
ment takes a particular form and individuals are not confined on a
part-time basis in their living quarters or on full-time basis in a
commercial hotel but, rather, confinement takes place at one or several
specially designed institutions. This confinement technology requires
that correctional institutions produce in addition to confinement per se
a certain level of hotel service and in most cases a specified level of
personal goods and services, including medical care. Thus, correctional
institutions, ss they are presently operated, produce multiple outputs
of which confinements hotel services, personal services, and rehabili-
tation are the most significant.
Actual measures of the various outputs must be specified. For
all outputs except rehabilitation the measurement problem is tract-
able. It is true that there are significant quality differences in the
confinement output, but in most cases this can be controlled by simply
Certainly for some local jails nad holding facilities the term correc-
tional institution is misleading, and they neither intend nor accomplish
a measurable amount of rehabilitation.
It is interesting to note in this connection that even in centralized
confinement centers all hotel services have not always been produced in
the inscription. A graphic example of this is the practice during the
French Revolution if allowing prisoners to have their meals catered by
private restaurants, at "-heir own expense.
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stratifying the analysis according to the security level of the insti-
tution. Likewise there are quality differences in hotel and personal
services, and while these present a more difficult measurement problem
than confinement, solutions, albeit imperfect ones, can be found in this
area. As for the output of rehabilitation, while there are simple theo-
retical measures (e.g., recidivism rates) empirically the measurement
problem is extremely complex. Because of the empirical problems in
measuring rehabilitation, most of the cost functions estimated in this
study exclude rehabilitation. Rather we have made the extreme assump-
tion that costs directed at rehabilitation do not show up in any of
the output measures we shall use. There is no doubt that cost functions
including rehabilitation output would be a desirable and useful tool for
correctional decision-makers, and this is certainly an area for future
research.
III.
The California Department of Corrections currently administers
12 major correctional institutions of which two—San Quentin State
Prison and Folsom State Prison—are classified as maximum security
prisons; three—Soledad or the Correctional Training Facility, the
California Men's Colony, and Deuel Vocational Institution—are medium
security prisons; and six—the California Institution for Men, the
California Conservation Center, the Sierra Convervation Center, the
In cases where escape ratios differ significantly between institutions
of similar security levels or over time in the same institution the prob-
lem of measuring confinement may be made more difficult but certainly not
impossible.
-7-
California Institution for Women, the California Rehabilitation Center,
and the California MeJical Facility—a~e either minimum security prisons
c
or special purpose institutions. Of these institutions; we have
chosen the two maximum security prisons and the three medium security
prisons for our cost. function estimation.
These five institutions represent the suoset of institutions for
which, in our opinion, the conceptual problems were the least con-
straining.
Folsom State Frit>on and San Qu^ntin State Prison were selected
for the estimation el short-run functions because, over the time period
covered in our data, the size or these prisons ze measured by design
capacity has been relatively constant. Turing the period under con-
sideration, 1948 tc 1964, th^ design cayaciv of Foleom State Prison
ranged from 1394 to 1994 w'rlie the design capacity at ^r*a Quentin dur-
ing the same period ranged from 256d t- 20 37.'' Given the narrow
band of capacity variation in both institutions, it was cur feeling
that these institutions very closely approxii atcJ the traditional
concept of i. fixe a. plant s±„c.
Since actual inmate populations at. Folsom uuring the period ranged
from 2141 to ?91? and fror 3426 u 4793 at San Quentin, rated capacity
is certainly no", a measure •-•i absolute prisoner capacity Lut rather an
.
'
•..
gA description of the institutions it available in a data appendix
available on reqi-.est from the authors
»
9
According to the Chief of Facilities pj.anrJ.ng for the Department of
Corrections (Mr. Thoirias L. Smlihsoii) , design capacity is an actual
count of cells, v:\rds and dormitor-.ee, allowing for single-celling.
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indication of the physical size of the plant. 10 While a relatively
fixed design capacity is not an exact counterpart of a fixed plant size
in a private firm, it is a close enough approximation to make the con-
cept of a short run cost function meaningful in this context.
However, there is one important aspect in which constant rated
capacity differs from the traditional concept of a fixed plant size.
When analyzing short run cost functions in private firms, it is usually
assumed that the degree of utilization of the plant does not itself
affect the nature of the output, i.e., that the quality of the output
remains constant. The usual assumption is the steel produced when the
mill is operating at 100 tons/month is the same as the steel that is
produced at 500 tons/month. While it is true that even in these simple
cases some quality deterioration takes place as the mill approaches
physical capacity, for all practical purposes the steel is the same over
a very large range of production levels. It is not at all clear that
we may say the same for the output of a prison of a fixed design capacity
as the inmate population varies, especially, as the inmate population
exceeds the design capacity.
As was discussed above, one of the outputs of a prison is confine-
ment and clearly the number of individuals confined per unit of time is
a reasonable measure of this output level. Moreover, it is reasonable
to assume that the quality of confinement per se can be held constant
As Mr. Smithson expressed the proposition,
"Capacity figures ai, physical count... and do not reflect
administrative management practices that might reduce or
increase available capacities."
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over a large range of inmate populations within a prison of fixed de-
sign capacity. Leaving the question of rehabilitation output aside,
prisons do produce outputs other than confinement. A prison produces
hotel services, and can this be kept at a constant level as the inmate
population varies? Certainly in extreme cases the hotel output of
a fixed capacity prison is reduced or at least significantly modified
as its confinement output (Inmate population per unit of time) is
increased. Even in the intermediate or less extreme cases one would
expect some deterioration in the hotel output of a fixed capacity in-
stitution as the confinement output or number of inmates rises.
Assuming this relationship between confinement output and hotel
services to be valid, of what relevance is it to our cost function esti-
mation? Since hotel services are produced jointly with confinement
—
more precisely, for any individual one year's hotel service is provided
with one year's confinement, if the quality of hotel service does not
vary with the level of confinement activity, our output measure is suffi-
cient for describing both activities. That is, if hotel services are
constant we can write the cost function for a prison as
C = C(PiH = H, R - R), (1)
where C is the annual cost of providing all non-rehabilitative outputs
(confinement and related hotel as well as personal goods and services),
P is number of inmates confined in the institution during that year,
H is hotel services held constant at quality level H (subject to the
point made below) and R is rehabilitation held constant at R. If, on
the contrary, hotel services are changing as P changes, then our cost
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function is relating annual costs to the quality of confinement
ser-
vices and a mixture of a change in the quantity and quality of hotel
services
.
As the data on rated capacity and inmate populations reported
above indicates, something other than single-celling has been the
norm at these institutions during the entire period. Thus, while
single-celling may be the desired level of hotel service, it has
not been the operational level and implicitly it appears to be
an
12
upper and not a lower bound on such services. In dealing with
the hotel service aspect of output, we have chosen to acknowledge
that
the quality of this input changes as the inmate population changes but
have assumed that it is relevant to decision-makers only when the
quality of such services approaches the correctional authorities ' lower
bound. In the case of Folsom and San Quentin we have taken the actual
inmate figures to imply that this lower bound was not reached during
the period 1948-64. Consequently, for inmate populations at
these
institutions within the historical bounds the interpretation of the
cost function is clear. However, for populations greater than those
historically experienced some care must be exercised in interpreting
the estimated relationship. These short run cost functions,
and in
fact all such functions based on a prison of fixed capacity, are
1:L
For simplicity we have deleted personal goods and services from this
discussion but without doing much violence to practice we can assume,
like confinement, they can be held constant as P increases.
12
It is our understanding that the actual lower bound on hotel services
in terms of space provided per inmate is substantially below those
implied
in most rated capacity figures.
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only useful management tools up to the population level P at which
the lower bound in terms of hotel services is reached. Simply put,
short-run cost functions have definite upper bounds. They can be used
for cost inferences only up to some P where P is defined as the inmate
level at which hotel services fall below the corectional authorities'
*
minimum permissible level. Even for inmate populations below P , the
fact that hotel services are changing as P changes should always be
kept in mind.
The starting point for actual cost function estimation, at a
single prison, is the type of data presented in Table 1. This table
shows total non-rehabilitative expenditures (FTC) and inmate popula-
13
tions (ADIPF) at Folsom State Prison from 1948 to 1964. It should
be emphasized ag.^in that, while the data in Table 1 is quite straight-
forward, assembling consistent historical data in this form is a non-
trivial task even in a system with as long a history of data collection
14
as California s.
13
Terminating our data base at 1964 does not indicate a disinterest in
more recent experience. In fact we were quite anxious to include more
recent data in our sample but comparable and detailed cost data by
institution was simply not available for more recent years. Since
switching to a "Progran" approach, California has stopped publishing
detailed budgets for each institution. Unfortunately, collecting unpub-
lished institutional data for more recent years proved to be too time
consuming an undertaining for this study. A "Program" approach cer-
tainly emphasizes the similarity between the Department of Corrections
and a private firm. It is unfortunate, however, that for the purposes
of this and perhaps other cost studies, one of the procedural aspects
of the California "Program" approach involves the publication of less
data on operations at the plant or prison level.
14
The actual historical budget data used in this construction had
never been collected as a series and rehabilitation expenditures have
never been systematically separated
.
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TABLE 1
Cost and Inmate Data
Folsom State Prison
YEAR FTC ADIPF
1948 $1,995,532 2,535
1949 2,037,461 2,750
1950 2,218,270 2,738
1951 2,407,471 2,415
1952 2,434,532 2,212
1953 2,693,584 2,500
1954 2,712,909 2,622
1955 2,732,171 2,436
1956 2,812,894 2,141
1957 3,100,055 2,460
1958 3,255,748 2,868
1959 3,410,436 2,450
1960 3,784,565 2,783
1961 3,815,040 2,919
1962 3,858,202 2,634
1963 3,923,725 2,526
1964 4,266,637 2,557
liforn:La, The Governor' s Budget
Notes: FTC = nominal total costs at Folsom,
ADIPF = average daily inmate population at Folsom.
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The expenditure data listed in the Table are not actually the
total cost of plant operation at various output levels. Missing from
the expenditure data are most of the capital charges associated with
the operation of this fixed capacity facility, specifically a measure
of the actual annual cost or annual opportunity cost to the State of
California of owning much of the in-place capital, such as the build-
ings and major equipment items at Folsom. For example, if instead
of owning the physical plant at Folsom the state had a long-term lease
on the facility then the expenditures listed in Table 1 would have
been significantly higher than the actual expenditure listed in the
table. Assuming that lease did not include any maintenance, then the
hypothetical lease payments might roughly approximate the capital charges
missing from the actual data in Table 1. The point is actually quite
simple: public enterprises such as prisons do not, in their annual
budgets, have imputed to them the costs of actually using much of their
in-place capital and thus, total recorded expenditures consistently
understate actual total costs of operation. For the purposes of short-run
cost analysis this underestimation is not crucial. While the omission
of capital charges understates the actual cost per inmate, it has very
little effect on the magnitude of a change in total costs due to change
in the inmate population.
While cost figures derived from actual budget data are not total
cost figures, neither are they a pure measure of variable costs. Unless
all fixed costs are entirely omitted from the budget data the expendi-
ture data does not represent pure variable costs. Judging from the bud-
get details and actual estimation results, it is unlikely that all fixed
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costs have been deleted. To the extent that cost functions estimated
from this data include an element of fixed costs, it once again does not
impinge on their relevance in answering the important short run question
of how total costs vary with changes in the inmate population.
The cost data in Table 1 span a period of 17 years, and thus the
effect of price level changes must be accounted for. Our procedure
for accomplishing this involved segregating the cost data into three
major categories: (1) Salaries and Wages (FTS) , (2) Purchases of Goods
and Services (FTOE) , (3) and Minor Equipment Purchases (FTK) . After
segregating the cost data, each category was deflated by the appro-
priate deflator. All price deflators were obtained from U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce publications and the details of the deflation pro-
cedure are presented in Appendix B. Table 2 gives the constant dol-
lar or deflated costs by category and Table 3 is the constant dollar
version of Table 1. In both Tables 2 and 3 the letter R preceding
the symbols defined above simply denotes a deflated series, e.g.,
RFTC is total non-rehabilitative expenditures at Folsom State Prison
in 1967 dollars. Thus, Table 3 contains the basic data actually used
in estimating a short run total cost function^for Folsom State Prison.
For the Folsom cost function the following two functional forms
were employed:
RFTC = Q
+ BjADIPF +
^
(2)
RFTC = aQ + c^ADIPF + a3 (ADIPF)
2
+ P2
(3)
The error terms, \l. and ii», are assumed to have a mean of zero and a
constant variance. 3Q and a in equations (2) and (3) represent
constant
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TABLE 2
Deflated Cost Data
Folsom State Prison
YEAR RFTS RFTOE RFTK
1948 1,690,270 862,463 96,173
1949 1,743,818 1,212,907 59,882
1950 1,715,260 1,361,316 96,346
1951 1,849,176 1,318,699 60,410
1952 1,849,230 1,199,431 57,343
1953 1,999,341 1,281,118 57,802
1954 2,018, 750 1,198,763 53,162
1955 2,026,762 1,095,293 44,282
1956 2,048,787 998,747 49,888
1957 2,070,887 1,124,384 51,836
1958 2,044,410 1,179,828 31,510
1959 2,152,715 1,103,100 49,750
1960 2,293,602 1,183,231 64,420
1961 2,206,049 1,206,842 40,812
1962 2,232,572 1,133,434 38,150
1963 2,257,986 1,025,726 67,294.
1964 2,253,661 1,068,099 55,653
:e of California, The Governor's Budget, 195C
Notes: RFTS = real salarie and wages,
RFTOE • real purchases of goods and services,
RFTK = real minor equipment purchases.
The deflators are explained in the text and more formally in the
appendix available on request.
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TABLE 3
Deflated3 Total Cost and Inmate Data
Folsoxa State Prison
YEAR RFTC ADIPF
1948 3,085,333 2,535
1949 3,016,607 2,750
1950 3,172,922 2,738
1951 3,228,285 2,415
1952 3,196,004 2,212
1953 3,338,261 2,500
1954 3,270,675 2,622
1955 3,166,337 2,436
1956 3,097,422 2,141
1957 3,247,107 2,460
1958 3,255,748 2,868
1959 3,305,565 2,450
1960 3,541,253 2,783
1961 3,453,703 2,919
1962 3,404,156 2,634
1963 3,351,006 2,526
1964 3,377,413 2,557
Lifornia, The Governor 's Budg
Notes: RFTC = real ^n^^>^ *"~~- t
ADIPF = average dialy inmate population.
a
The deflators are explained in the text and more formally in the
appendix available on request.
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terms or, in this context., cost elements not associated with the level
of output measured in terms of inmate popul&tlon. Given Eq. 2 as the
relevant cost fuiictxon, the marginal iost uf an additional prisoner
is 3-. • On the other hand, if E^, 3 turns out to be the bast approxi-
mation to the actual co^c j-ur.ctlv.-n, then' the incremfcntal or marginal
cost will be (a. + 2a„At)I?i')
.
OLS techniques indicated the*; Fq. 2 or the simple linear cost
function is the better approximation. The results are given in Table
4. Our actual eLtitpavec' \ rsiou of Eq. (< ) is
RFTC » 2,499,932 + 295 ADXPF, (2A)
2
with an R, cr multiple correlation coefficient of .,20. 3oth para-
meters were stat?.stically significant. From ''.A wc can infer that add-
ing an additional inmate to Folooni sosts approximately $296 in 196?
dollars. The explannioiry power of the regression is not very large,
and one must, therefore s draw ct ypl dons gingerly^ ?.%. appears to be
the case tbet for confinement ? J hj->C.fcl services there v7ere signifi-
cant aecoc:i.aie& ot scloe ei F.3;.r>. In fact, in the Folscm case the
increments! cost of adding a y ' soaer woe ?nl> ajout 25,^ of the average
cost per inr.iL dizulr.;, J.-e ptr.iocU ."
Not entire.7.* s„':isfi.ei wiLh tas explanatory y -.wer of the relation-
ship in Eq. 2A, v-e investigated several causes of cost variation not
It should be noted ana trip, in miud wh?u evaluating these results
that all during the petlod untie..- consideration Fol^om was operating
above Its rated capacity and cert'.Iuiy within a very narrow range of
output relative to its poto.nt5.al output variation.
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TABLE 4
Estimated of Total Cost Functions
for Folsom State Prison, 1948-1964
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE CONSTANT ADIPF ADF2
RFTC 2547580 207
(102)**
RFTC 644213 1765
(3218)
-.29
(.63)
RFTC 2499932 296
(157)
RFTC 1849466 268
(124)
FMA FVC DVM2
20177
(4305)
RFTC -373117 1156 -.18 47687
2154884
(679248)
-805730 81239 25985
(2581)** (.50) (57998) (1586774) (98058) (14956)
R
.69
(.65)
.20
(.09)
.20
(.15)
.53
(.46)
(.73).
(.57)
All estimates are 0LS and additional regression results are
available upon request.
**Standard error
Source: ' State of California, The Governors Budget , 1950-1967.
Variables: RFTC = Deflated Folsom total costs,
ADIPF = average daily inmate population at Folsom,
ADF2 - (ADIPF) 2
,
FMA = median age of inmate population at Folsom,
FVC = percent of total inmate population at Folsom
committed for violent crimes (homicide, as-
sault, robbery, and sex offenses),
DVM2 dummy variable for capacity change at Folsom,
T = time' trend indicator with 1948 = 1, 1949 - 2,
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measured by our single output variable, ADIPF. Included in this in-
vestigation were additional factors such as the median age of Folsom
inmates, a variable for the capacity change at Folsom, the percentage
of total Inmates committed for commission of violent crimes (FVC) , and
finally a time trend variable (T) . These regressions are also reported
in Table 4.
First,, by including a variable measuring the violence history of
inmates (FVC) the estimated cost function becomes:
RFTC - 1,849,466 + 268 ADIPF + 2,154,884 FVC (2B)
2
and the R jumps to 0.53, a significant increase in explanatory power
over Eq. (2A) . From 2B it appears as if the composition of the inmate
population is quite important in determining the absolute cost of oper-
ating a prison. Consistent with our intuition the more violent the
prison population the higher are its total costs. One would expect
that the costs of more guards, of isolating prisoners, and the like
would vary directly with the violence record of the inmates.
However, the most interesting aspect of 2B is that the marginal
cost is extremely close to the estimate provided by the simple model
in Eq. 2A. Thus, while we can explain more of the variation in total
costs by including a violence index in the equation, the estimated
magnitude of the key parameter in the system (the coefficient of ADIPF)
is not significantly changed by this procedure.
21
This index was construpted by taking the annual percent of total
inmates who had been sentenced for the violent crimes of robbery, homo-
cide, assault, and sex crimes.
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Our next respecification of the model Involved the use of a simple
time trend. In this case the estimated equation is
RFTC - 2,547,580 + 207 ADIPF + 20177 T (2C)
2
where T is the time trend. This equation had an R of 0.69. The
interpretation of a positive coefficient on T is that there is a secular
increase in the cost of operating a fixed capacity prison. Since the
% simple correlation between T and FVC is 0.88, part of what we are measur-
ing in the time variable is probably the secular increase in the per-
centage of inmates with a violent history. Nonetheless given that
the explanatory power of this specification exceeds that of 2B, there
are obviously factors other than the increase in FVC over time that
cause the secular increase in the operating costs of Folsom.
Unfortunately, data limitations prevented us from exploring this
area in more detail, but it is clear frcm these two simple extensions
that very simple modifications of the elementary linear model in 2A
greatly increase the explanatory power of the estimated relationship.
Nonetheless, in all of the cases presented here the estimates of the
marginal cost of confinement and hotel services are very close in mag-
nitude, and our comments regarding the interpretation of the incremental
cost estimate in Eq. 2A remain valid in these more complex specifica-
tions .
In analyzing the Folsom cost data, we took a very direct approach
and estimated a short run total cost function. Our results were extremely
Recall that we are working with constant dollar costs and this secular
increase is not merely a simple inflation factor.
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interesting and suggested that for institutions like Folsom State Prison,
operating at relatively high levels of output (inmate populations consid-
erably in excess of design capacity) , the incremental cost of adding an
additional inmate was substantially below the average cost, which in
this context is often referred to as the cost per inmate. Moreover,
at these high output levels, our regression results suggested that
the total cost function is best approximated by a relationship involving
a constant marginal cost. Thus at high output levels, the incremental
cost of adding an inmate to the existing population is approximately
constant over a rather large range of population changes. Intuitively,
adding an additional inmate or, for that matter, an additional 50 in-
mates, increases total costs by approximately the same amount at pop-
ulation levels 10% above design capacity as it does at levels 50% to
60% above design capacity.
Another, and complementary method of analyzing prison cost data,
is to estimate short-run average cost functions. This procedure allows
us to work with a cost figure that is already familiar to many correc-
tional decision-makers, the cost per inmate. In this approach to cost
function estimation, instead of analyzing the relationship of total costs
to total output, as we did in the case of Folsom, we analyze the rela-
tionship between cost per inmate (average cost) and total output.
The sample used in this Case Study for the analysis of short-run
average cost functions is drawn from San Quentin's post-war expenditure
and output data. In Table 5 we have presented the same data for San
Quentin as was presented, for Folsom. Transforming the total cost data
into cost per inmate (AVDSQTC) format, we get the cost series shown in
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TABLE 5
Deflated Cost and Inmate Data
San Quentin State Prison
YEAR
1948
RSQTC
$5,083,855
ADIPSQ
3988
1949 4,631,915 4023
1950 4,960,539 3750
1951 5,074,511 3636
1952 5,133,211 3781
1953 5,253,772 3737
1954 5,161,086 3935
1955 5,114,222 3480
1956 4,994,232 3426
1957 4,974,927 4130
1958 5,069,511 4742
1959 4,885,032 4326
1960 5,361,720 4793
1961 5,179,408 4565
1962 5,070,398 3794
1963 5,251,443 4265
1964 5,211,327 3850
Source: State of California, The Governor' s Budget, 1950-1967.
Notes: RSQTC = Real total costs at San Qutmtin,
ADIPSQ average daily inmate population.
The method of deflation is exactly that use on the Folsom
cost data.
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Table 6 and this series serves as our basic input for estimating San
Quentin's short-run average cost function.
If we refer back to Eq. 2, we see that this simple linear form of
the total cost function implies, in the case of San Quentin, the follow-
ing form for the average cost function:
AVDSQTC - YQ + Y3 RADSQ (3)
where yQ is a constant term and RADSQ - 1/ADIPSQ. Thus, if San Quentin'
s
total cost at high output levels is also best approximated by the func-
tional form in Eq. 2, then its average cost function will be of the form
shown in Eq. 3. In this case the cost per inmate (AVDSQTC) will change
by -y1 [1/(ADIPSQ) ]. As long as y- is positive, the cost per inmate
will decrease as the inmate population increases and the magnitude of
this decrease will be related to the inmate population and in fact will
18
be smaller, the larger the inmate population. The magnitude of y.
will determine the magnitude of the decrease in average cost at any in-
mate level.
Estimating Eq. 3 using the San Quentin data, we obtained the follow-
ing average cost function:
AVDSQTC = 59 + 4,844,719 RADSQ (3A)
(11.5) (t-ratios)
18
J (
d AVDSQTC.
diS J Z^tl/CADIPSQ) 3 ]
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TABLE 6
Deflated Average Cost and Inmate Data
San Quentin State Prison
YEAR AVDSQTC ADIPSQ
1948 1275 3988
1949 1151 4023
1950 1323 2750
1951 1396 3636
1952 1358 3781
1953 1405 3737
1954 1312 3935
1955 1470 3480
1956 1458 3426
1957 1205 4130
1958 1069 4742
1959 1129 4326
1960 1119 4793
1961 1135 4565
1962 1337 3794
1963 1231 4265
1964 1354 3850
Source: State of California, The Governor's Budget , 1950-1967.
Notes: AVDSQTC Average total costs at San Quentin,
ADIPSQ - average dialy inmate population at San Quentin.
See the text.
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2
Details are given In Table 7. This relationship has an R of .90 and
the estimate of the coefficient 6 is statistically significant. We
can reject the hypothesis that y, < 0, and thus, based on Eq. 3A,
we can conclude that at San Quentin, as at Folsom, cost per inmate de-
creases as the inmate population increases. In terms of magnitude, Eq.
3 implies that at an inmate level of 3500, the decrease is 40<: per in-
mate and a at level of 4500, it is only 23c per inmate. Nonetheless,
these calculations are merely illustrative. The important point is
the behavior of the cost per inmate as the inmate population increases,
and the fact that at San Quentin as at Folsom, the short-run marginal
cost of confinement and of hotel services is substantially below the
cost per inmate (average cost).
However, unlike our results on the total cost function for Folsom,
in the San Quentin estimations it is more difficult to establish one
functional form as having superior explanatory power. As the results
in Table 7 show, while Eq. 3A has no less explanatory power than other
2
forms of the average cost function, the adjusted R *s are too close
in magnitude for us to use this measure to establish (3A) as the best
approximation. Nevertheless it is true that the estimated coefficients
2
on terms ADIPSQ and (ADIPSQ) tend to be less significant in the
sense that their standard errors are much larger in relation to the
coefficients than is the case with RADSQ. Thus in equations involving
2
terms RADSQ, ADIPSQ and (ADIPSQ) , only the coefficient on RADSQ passes
the traditional t-test for significance. Although Eq. 3A appears to be
an adequate approximation of San Quentin* s average cost function, at
least over the range of population experienced during the period, all
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TABLE 7
Estimate Cost Functions for San
Quentin State Prison (1948-1964)
R
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE CONSTANT RADSQ2 ADIPSQ ADSQ2 SQVC SQMA LADSQ <H2 )
AVDSQTC 59 4844719
(421324)**
.90
(.89)
AVDSQTC -1776 8557277
(4186712)
.22
(.25)
.90
(.88)
AVDSQTC -902 7432285
(2823925)
.00002
(.00002)
.90
(.88)
AVDSQTC -956 7462883
(2930122)
.00002
(.00002)
98
(491)
.90
(.87)
AVDSQTC -1701 8658719
(2956452)
.00003
(.00002)
-589
(684)
21
(15)
.92
(.89)
LAVSQ 15 -.95
(.09)
.89
(.88)
All estimates are OLS.
**Standard error
Source: State of California, The Governor's Budget , 1950-1967.
Variables: AVDSQTC = RSQTC/ADIPSQ, Deflated cost per inmate at San Quentin,
LAVSQ = natural logarithm of deflated cost per inmate at San Quentin,
RADSQ2 = 1/ADIPSQ,
ADIPSQ = average daily inmate population at San Quentin,
ADSQ2 = (ADIPSQ) 2
,
SQVC = percent of total inmate population at San Quentin
committed for violent crimes (homicide, robbery,
assault, and sex offenses),
SQMA = median age of inmate population at San Quentin each year,
LADSQ = natural logarithm of average daily inmate
population at San Quentin.
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of the estimated cost functions in Table 7 evidence decreasing aver-
age costs up to an inmate population far larger than those in the sample.
In other words, whichever of the cosi; equations selected, there are
decreasing costs per inmate up to populations of at least 5200 inmates.
Equivalently, all cost func zioas for San Quentin presented in Table 7
show marginal cost below average coat up to an output (inmate popula-
tion) significantly larger than the highest output experienced at San
Quentin during the post-war period.
As our results indicate Eq. 3A is adequate for analyzing San Quentin'
s
cost function over the range actually experienced during the post-war
period; however, considering another functional form does provide addi-
tional insight. For e:^ample, instead uf using Eq. 3A as an approximation
to the short rvn average cost function, let us approximate it using the
estimated cost fmiction (3B)
.
AVPSQTC = -902 + 7432285 EADSQ + ,00002 ADSQ2 (3B)
wtere ADSQ2 = (AlyIPSQ) / * It is straightforward to establish that Eq.
3B implies that cosr per iamate (AVDSQTC) declines until the inmate popu-
19
lation reaches approximately 5700 and increases thereafter. ' Thus Eq.
(3B) implies that average edst is greater than marginal cost up to 5700
19 vdAVDr.>jTC*
iATOSQTC m ^jADipgQ } >
dADIPSQ dADIPSQ U »
at ADIPSQ = 5700 in Eq. 3B.
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lnmates and less than marginal cost thereafter. Translated into the
terminology of corrections: the existing cost per inmate figure will,
at an institution like San Quentin, overestimate the incremental cost
of an additional inmate up to 5200 inmates and thereafter the existing
cost per inmate figure will underestimate it. Since these estimated
cost functions lack precision at inmate levels substantially above the
sample bound, this discussion must be interpreted with care. What a cost
function like Eq. 3B indicates, is that while our experience in insti-
tutions like San Quentin suggests that cost per inmate substantially
overestimates incremental costs, there is a strong possibility that at
very high inmate populations (relative to design capacity) cost per in-
mate would actually underestimate incremental costs. The concept of a
U-shaped short run average cost curve for a prison conforms very closely
to the traditional assumption about the shape of such curves for private
firms and is an area that deserves additional attention. Unfortunately,
our data base had too restricted an output range to explore this pheno-
menon adequately.
The impact of our findings on San Quentin* s cost structure is that
they support our previous work on Folsom. That is, existing cost per
inmate tends seriously to overestimate the impact on short run total
costs of increasing inmate populations. Multiplying existing cost per
inmate data times a small projected increase in inmate population will
significantly overestimate the cost of this projected increase. More-
over, the data is consistent with the hypothesis that prisons such as
Folsom and San Quentin are underutilized in terms of confinement out-
20
put, total confinement costs might be minimized by using one large
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facllity more Intensely. However, with this prescription one needs
to recall that prisons produce a joint output and that maximizing
efficiency with regard to only one of those outputs might be detri-
mental to the others. It may well be that minimizing confinement costs
pushes hotel services and rehabilitation below the acceptable lower
bound. In any case, decision-makers should be aware that the data
from Folsom and San Quentin imply that at present utilization rates,
the short-run cost per inmate substantially overstate the incremental
confinement costs.
IV.
Unlike the design capacity of both Folsom and San Quentin, the
design capacity of DVI, CMC and CTF have varied considerably over the
21
post-war period. DVI had a design capacity of 540 in 1948 and 1523
in 1964. CMC started operation in 1954 with a design capacity of 600
and in 1964 had a design capacity of 3762; finally, CTF or Soledad had
a design capacity of 600 in 1948 and 3239 in 1964. Thus, these medium
security prisons have not had a fixed plant size over the post-war period
and represent an excellent example for estimating long run cost functions,
For the correctional decision-maker such functions help answer the
20
If there were economices of scale in confinement one would minimize
long run total confinement costs by operating a plant at an output lower
than the output level at which average cost is minimized. However if
there are such scale economies, how do we explain the existence of two
maximum security prisons? Another explanation in terms of risk aversion
is provided below in our discussion of overcapacity in jails.
21
The data appendix gives details of capacity variation.
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questlon: How do total costs vary with changes in inmate populations
when all factors including the institutions' size are variable?
This is a crucial question and it is unfortunate that data restric-
tions prevent us from exploring the area in sufficient detail in this
study. First, the lack of capital cost data seriously restricts our
ability to estimate pure long run cost functions. While the lack of
such data was not a serious drawback in short-run cost function esti-
mation, it is a major obstacle in long-run cost function estimation.
At present, for state institutions, we have only the most informal
evidence. Based on an informal review of some capital appropriations
information, it appears that capital costs are proportional to output.
However, at this point, proportionality is only a conjecture and re-
quires a detailed and formal investigation to establish whether the
data are actually consistent with this hypothesis.
In addition to the capital cost problem, there appear to be many
more problems with the interpretation of the basic budget data than
was the case with Folsom and San Quentin. Extracting a consistent series
for non-rehabilitation total costs posed a more difficult problem in
these cases. Given the data problems in this part of the study, we
prefer to view these estimated long run cost functions more as an il-
lustration than as a rigorous estimation of an actual long run cost
function.
Our estimates of long run total operating cost functions for DVT,
CMC and CTF which have the highest explanatory power were,
RDVTTC - 304,334 + 1,773 DVIAPIP, (4)
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RCMCTC = -53,437 + 1517 CMCADIP, and (5)
RCTFTC = 909,307 + 885 CTFADIP - .009(CTFAIP) 2 (6)
where RDVITC, RCMCTC and RCTFTC are deflated total operating costs at
DVI, CMC and CTF respectively and DVTADIP, CMCADIP and CTFADIP are
average daily inmate populations at DVI, CMC and CTF respectively.
o
The R 's for Eqs. (4), (5) and (6) are .74, .97 and .80 respectively.
Table 8 reports these results.
It is interesting to note that in two cases (DVI and CMC) a simple
linear cost function is the best approximation and in those cases the
incremental or marginal costs ($1773 and $1517) are very close to costs
22
per inmate figures or average costs. This suggests that in the long
run, at least, operating costs are nearly proportional to output. That
is, when an institution's size Is variable, doubling output will approx-
imately double operating costs. In this case, the results for CTF are
somewhat of an anomaly. For CTF the best fitting estimation is nonlinear
and is characterized by marginal cost substantially below average cost.
In fact, marginal costs are actually declining in this case. The CTF
results suggests a non-proportional relationship between total operating
costs and inmate populations and one in which doubling inmate populations
will actually less than double long run operating costs.
At this point, our results on estimating long run cost functions
for state prisons are far too inclusive for us to conclude that, in fact,
22
The negative term on Eq, 5 does suggest a nonlinearity at ouptut
ranges outside the sample.
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TABLE 8
Estimated Long-Run Cost Function for Medium
Security Correctional Institutions, 1948-1964
DEPENDENT
2 „2
VARIABLE CONSTANT CTFADIP (CTFADIP) DVTADIP (DVIADIP)^ CMCADIP (CMCADIP) Z JT
.12RCTFTC 2865834 -17
(12)**
RCTFTC 909308 885 -.009
(130) (.001)
RDVITC 304334
RDVITC 108405
RCMCTC*** -63626
RCMCTC*** -53437
1773
(274)
-149
(2116)
1
(1)
1548
(70)
1517
.80
.74
.75
.97
.009 .97
(241) (.066)
All estimates are OLS.
**Standard error.
***1954-1964
Source: State of California, The Governor's Budget , 1950-1967.
Variables: RCTFTC = Deflated total cost at the Correctional Training
Facility (Soledad),
CTFADIP average daily inmate population at CTF,
RDVITC = deflated total cost at Deuel Vocational Institute,
DVIADIP = average daily inmate population at DVI,
RCMCTC = deflated total cost at California Men's Colony
(San Luis Obispo)
,
CMCADIP = average daily inmate population at CMC.
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long run operating costs are proportional to inmate populations. In
part, because of the inconclusive nature of our results in this area,
we decided to investigate long run cost functions using another sample,
city and county jails in the State of California.
V.
Up to this point we have reported on our investigation of empirical
cost functions based on time-series data. The cost function estimations
reported were for specific institutions and were based on the historical
cost data for those institutions. However there was a second part of
our investigation that involved the estimation of cost functions using
cross section data. In this experiment we used the cost and output data
generated by the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics* Jail Space
Utilization Study to estimate _a cost function for city and county jails
in California. In other words, we used data collected on specific jails
at one point in time (1971-72) to estimate a cost relationship that would
23
explain the cost structure of city and county jails in general.
Using this cross section approach enabled us to shed some additional
light on estimating long run cost functions and to investigate a number
of interesting areas precluded by data restrictions in the time-series
analysis.
The first question we investigated using this data source was the
relationship of capital costs to inmate population. As in the case of
23
A list of the jails covered in this survey is available in the
data appendix, available on request.
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state institutions, city and county institutions do not include capital
costs in their operating budgets, and the results in the survey did not
provide a direct measure of such costs. However some respondents to
the survey (35) did give the original construction costs of their physical
plant, and the year in which the construction was actually completed.
We felt that by using this data we might implicitly obtain one major
capital cost relationship by using the revealed or estimated rela-
tionship between investment in plant and equipment and output. In order
to investigate the relationship between investment and output we first
transformed the construction cost data into a constant dollar series by
using the Department of Commerce deflator for government construction.
Then, assuming that confinement technology was constant over the period
24
covered, we estimated the following investment functions:
X
4Q - 1,066,514 + 2180 (X18 ) (7)
X
4Q
= 1,321,703 - 1746(X18 ) + 1942(xJg ) (8)
where X. _ is deflated costs of physical plant and X, „ is the rated
capacity of the institution. Also, see Table 9. In neither case was
2
the explanatory power of the relationship overwhelming (R = 0.12 in
Eq. 7, and 0.14 in Eq. 8). Adjusted for the difference in the number
—2
of variables, the explanatory power (R ) of Eq. 7 is trivially better
than Eq. 8. The coefficient estimate in Eq. 7 is significantly better
than the estimates in Eq. 8 and in this sense the simple lienar form
2
is superior to the form involving X. .
24
A full list of variables is given in the data appendix,
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TABLE 9
Investment Functions for California Jails
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE CONSTANT X18 (X18)
2 £ £ N
X40 1066514
(701654)*
2180
(1022)
.12 .094 35
X40 1321703
(763991)
-1746
(4639)
1942
(2238)
.14 .086 35
All estimates are OLS.
*Standard Error
Source: California Department of Justice, Bureau of Criminal
Statistics, Jail Space Utilization Study , 1974.
Variables: X40 = Deflated costs of physical plant for jails,
X18 = rated capacity of the jail.
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We next attempted to use the cross section data for estimating a
long run operating ccst function. The cost function that was estimated
using the Jail Space Utilization data was a long run function because
across the sample of 128 institutions, all factors were variable. In
concrete terms s the rated capacity of institutions included in the
survey, although not in any actual estimation, ranges from a low of
6 to a high of 3251. Thus, in no meaningful sense was the plant size
constant, or for that matter was any other input constant, across the
sample. Again, because no explicit capital charges were included in the
budget figures, the best that we could do was to estimate a long run
total operating cost function.
Estimating a long run cost function using cross section data is not
without difficulties. There is the obvious problem of assuming that all
of the jails in the sample actually produced the same output. To some
extent we have adjusted for this by considering attributes of the output
and of the institutions themselves in several of the estimates that
appear in Table 10. Considering the attributes of the output was of
particular importance here because of the impossibility, in many in-
stances, of obtaining non-rehabilitation total costs. Thus, we were
forced in most estimations to use total costs unadjusted for rehabili-
tation and attempted to net out the non-confinement costs in the esti-
mation itself. It is worth noting at this point that in terms of pro-
grams we usually associate with rehabilitation, only paid counseling
proved to be strongly associated with variations in total cost.
Perhaps a more serious problem in estimating a long run cost
function, whether it is on cross section or time series data, is the
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assumption that, at least on the average, decision-makers in charge of
a confinement operation actually minimize total costs at any output
level. When investigating a cost function for an institution whose size
has been constant for some time, this assumption seems ultimately
plausible; especially if the plant manager is most interested in reha-
bilitation. For the case in which the manager is very interested in
rehabilitation, cost minimization of confinement enables him to devote
a maximum amount of his limited resources to rehabilitation. Since we
were concentrating on cost functions for confinement in the fixed plant
cases, our assumption appears very reasonable in the analysis of Folsom
and San Quentin. However, once we leave the area of fixed capacity insti-
tutions, the proposition of cost minimization at any output level is
less straightforward. It may be quite plausible to assume that a manager
of fixed size plant minimizes costs for any output level, but this does
not imply that decision-makers considering the size or scale of plant
have enough information (in some cases the proper incentive) to pick the
optimum size institution for any output level. If lack of information
causes decisions regarding scale of institution to be biased in the
sense that decision-makers consistently choose too small or too large a
facility, in terms of cost minimization, then estimated long run cost
functions will not be the analogue of the economists' long run cost
function and may be of only limited direct use to correctional decision-
makers. The main utility of such estimations may be to point out the
bias in past decisions,
Still another problem of estimation ufing this particular cross
section data is the transient nature -.1 the inmate population in many
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city and county facilities. While some of this distortion has been
accounted for in several of the estimations where the type of facility
has been explicitly introduced, we doubt all of this bias has been
removed. With a large transient population, facilities may tend to be
built with a design capacity that exceeds their expected output or
population. In fact, if decision-makers feel that there must always
be "room at the inn" their plants will always be too large for cost
minimization with respect to average daily populations. Excess capacity
will be built into the system as insurance, and the plants may be minimum
cost in terms of the maximum inmate population that the decision-maker
feels he must be able to accommodate on extremely short notice. Such
risk aversion will certainly bias the estimated function upward relative
to a minimum total cost function on expected values. However, if there
is a reasonable amount of consensus concerning the degree of excess
capacity, the estimates based on this data, while they may not confoim
precisely to the cost function of simple economic theory, will still
be of interest to correctional decision-makers at the city and county
level. Given the desired degree of excess capacity, the estimated
function will give the operational relationship between operating cost
variation and average inmate population in systems with large trans-
ient populations.
Having explored sorae of the problems in this part of the study,
we are now in a position to present some of the major results of our
25
estimatxon:
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X^ = 199,750 + 2881 X2Q (8)
Xn = 339,427 + 1862X2Q + .37 X^ (9)
X26
= 195,349 + 3501 X2Q - 1.14 X^Q
+ .00048 X^
Q (10)
where X~, = total annual operating costs of the jail, and X2Q is the
2
average daily population of the jail. The adjusted R *s for the equa-
tions are 0.78, 0.79, and 0.80 respectively. Again, as in the case of
long run functions for state prisons, the appropriate functional form
is not immediately obvious.
From inspecting the details of the estimation in Table 10, we
notice that the least significant coefficients in the estimations are
2 3
the coefficients on X and X__ in Eq. 10, and of these, the coeffi-
cient Xl_ has the highest standard error relative to the coeffficient
estimate. If we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on
X-_ in Eq. 10 is in fact zero, then all equations evidence non-decreasing
marginal costs. Moreover the increase in marginal cost in both Eqs. 9
and 10 would be quite small. For example, in Eq. 9 the increase in
marginal cost per inmate is .75 or $75 per 100 inmates. Given that the
mean of X«
n
is 240, this variation in marginal cost is not very
significant, and it appears that we can accept the simple linear form
in Eq. 8 as an operational approximation to the long run cost function.
Now if we take this analysis one step further and introduce a qual-
ity of hotel service variable our results become even more interesting.
25
Only 63 of the 128 institutions listed in the Jail Space Utilization
Study , reported sufficient data for this estimation.
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TABLE 10
Estimated Total Operating Cost Functions for
California City and County Jails, 1971-72
DEPENDENT
U . VARIABLE CONSTANT X20 (X20) 2 (X20) 3 (X18) X42 *i £ N
X26 199750
(106804)*
2881
(196)
.78 .78 63
X26 339427
(121003)
1862
(495)
.37
(.16)
.80 .79 63
X26 195349
(139932)
3501
(9778)
-1.74
(1.10)
.00048
(.00026)
.81 .80 63
X26 142489
(216711)
1972
(835)
910
(.815)
.78 .77 60
X43 186185
(103402)
2861
(190)
.79 .79 63
X43 322.976
(117036)
1863
(479)
.36
(.16)
.80 .79 63
X26 -130
(271730)
1627
(508)
25809
(11603)
.68 .61 12
X26 85105
(286747)
3516
(2024)
-1687
(1750)
24740
(11201)
.72 .62 12
X43 .4488
(1.020)
.0033
(.0016)
.0428
(.0392)
.53 9
XI 1.0561
(.0745)
-.0001
(.0001)
4.90
(<93)
(1/X20) .32 72
1 estimates are OLS.
tandard error.
urce: California Department
tion Study, 1974.
of Justic e, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Jail Space Utiliza-
riables: See the data appendix for a complete list.
X26 = Total operating costs,
X43 = toptal operating costs minus capital outlays,
XI = average cost of food per inmate day,
X20 = average estimated daily inmate population,
X18 = total rated capacity,
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Using square footage per inmate at rated capacity, we obtain the follow-
ing estimated cost function:
X
26
= -130 + 1627 X
20
+ 25,809 3L^
2
(11)
where X,
2
is the square footage measure. This relationship suggests
that if you hold service level constant, then we have a proportional
relationship between output and operating costs when the jail size is
allowed to vary. That is, double the inmate population, keeping hotel
services constant, and you will double the operating costs. Only 12
jails provided sufficient information for this estimation and thus
while the results are suggestive, they are by no means definitive. '
VI.
We may now summarize our findings. It is worth re-iterating
that our measure of output is simply prisoners confined for each of
the three types of correctional institutions which we have studied.
We have not found it possible explicitly to keep the quality of the
hotel and personal services constant, save in an Imperfect way for
jails. To the extent that those services are inversely related to
the number of prisoners confined in a fixed-capacity institution,
our results underestimate the total cost of the correctional industry.
2fi
In another small sample result, using average daily cost data
supplied in the survey, we found a very small increase in average con-
finement costs as inmate population increases. See Table 10, eqns.
9 and 10.
27
We have only reviewed selected results from our investigation
of California jails. The interested reader is referred to the ad-
ditional results in the data appendix.
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Additionally, we have tried to avoid the knotty problem of rehabi-
litated output by deducting all those items in the Department of Cor-
rections* budgets which were clearly identifiable as rehabilitation-
related. In whichever direction that rehabilitation and confinement
are related, our estimated functions may be biased, according as to
how accurately we have netted out rehabilitation costs and our out-
put measure does not confound confined and reformed prisoners.
For the two maximum security prisons—San Quentin and Folsom
—
we found significant economies of scale in confinement regardless of
whether we estimated total or average cost functions. For both prisons
we also found a significant and slightly increasing marginal cost
associated with confining a more violent inmate population.
For the three medium security prisons—the Correctional Training
Facility (Soledad), the Deuel Vocational Institute, and the California
Men's Colony (San Luis Q'bispo)—we were able to estimate long-run
cost functions since capacity changed significantly in all three in-
stitutions over the sample period, 1948-1964. For Deuel and the CHC
we discovered constant returns to scale in confinement with long-run
marginal and average costs approximately equal at levels of $1500-
$1700. There was evidence for long-run economies of scale in con-
finement only at the CTF.
Lastly, we used the extensive survey of the California Bureau
of Criminal Statistics' Jail Space Utilization Study of 1971-72 to
estimate cost functions for city and county jails. It was necessary
to produce separate estimates for capital and operating costs. Our
regressions suggest a simple linear relationship between the capacity
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of a jail and the real costs of physical plant, but the relationship
is not statistically powerful. For the estimates of long-run operat-
ing costs, we could not reject the hypothesis of non-decreasing long-
run marginal costs. The best fit was for constant returns to scale
with a very low marginal operating cost of less than a dollar. By
introducing a service quality variable, we found still stronger evi-
dence of long-run constant returns to scale for city and county jails.
These conclusions have clear public policy implications for
those concerned with crime and the treatment of criminals. We stress
that these estimates are a beginning and that much further research
is needed in the economics of correctional institutions.
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